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Arctic Focus: The Royal Canadian 
Navy in Arctic Waters, 1946-1949
Elizabeth B. Elliot-Meisel
What the Aegean Sea was to classical antiquity, what the 
Mediterranean was to the Roman world, what the Atlantic Ocean 
was to the expanding Europe of Renaissance days, the Arctic 
Ocean is becoming to the world of aircraft and atomic power. 
— H.L. Keenleyside, 1949.1
During World War II the United States and Canada cooperated in joint defence projects in the Canadian North. These projects included such ventures as the Northwest Staging Route, the Alaska Highway, 
the Crimson Project, and operations in the Aleutian Islands. In the postwar 
period continental security, mainly air defence, focused on the previously 
ignored Arctic and Arctic Ocean.2 Less well-known is Canada’s Arctic pres-
ence, especially that of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), in the immediate 
postwar years. Wartime development in the Canadian North raised con-
cerns about sovereignty and security, which led Canadians to look to their 
northern waters.3 In assessing the postwar world, Canadians were forced to 
size up the increasing tension between the United States and the USSR and 
to evaluate the likely impact of this tension on their own nation. In addi-
tion, Canadians had to weigh the potential strength of the nascent United 
Nations; take into account the increasingly close relationship with the United 
States on the traditional British connection; and determine the size and com-
position of Canada’s contribution to its own and to continental defence. To 
help in these deliberations, the Post-Hostilities Problems Committees began 
work in mid-1943. After the war, the Arctic’s strategic significance reinforced 
the wisdom of Canada’s wartime look at the North.
 The events of and attitudes toward Canada’s immediate postwar de-
mobilization and military budget cuts have been analyzed by historians 
and retired naval personnel, as have the Canadian role in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, and Canada’s military contribution to the Korean 
War.4 But just what the military in general and the RCN in particular did 
between 1945 and 1949 is less well-known. That Canadian warships engaged 
in Arctic cruises during this period is not generally realized. According to 
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Commander Barry Coombs, USN, “[t]he period which preceded the Korean 
conflict had a marginal impact on the shaping of the Canadian Navy.”5 Some 
might criticize Coombs’ comment as that of an American unappreciative of 
the difficulty the RCN faced in attempting to carve out a postwar balanced 
fleet and an Arctic presence. Coombs never mentioned the RCN’s attempt 
to operate in the North or the intangible tie Canadians have to that region.6 
But even former RCN officers neglect the Arctic. Canadian defence analyst 
Commander Peter Haydon, RCN (ret), who believed that “the 1945-1955 per-
iod forms an interesting window through which to look at the origins of 
many basic policies that shaped Canada’s Cold War navy,” did not address 
the Arctic in his chapter of the third volume of Canada’s naval history, A 
Nation’s Navy. Commander Tony German, RCN (ret) only devotes two sen-
tences to the Arctic, and those relate to Labrador in the 1950s.7 Other Canadian 
authors who do note the North fail to delve deep; few papers or chapters of 
books on the RCN mention the Northern Cruise of September 1948. And yet 
it was an important mission, not so much for what it accomplished militarily, 
which was quite limited, but for what it represented in terms of Canada’s 
emotional attachment to the North and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of 
the RCN reflecting that emotional attachment with an active presence.
The RCN and Postwar Dreams
This chapter looks at the RCN in these post-World War II/pre-NATO years, in 
order to illuminate the multiple theatres in which the RCN hoped to operate, 
explain the role it proposed to play, assess the feasibility of maintaining a 
presence in these theatres, and highlight the 1948 Northern Cruise. While 
an Arctic presence was consistently a goal of the RCN, the reality of budget 
cuts, personnel shortages, and allied commitments forced it reluctantly to 
abandon the dream. It did not, however, die without a concerted effort.
Canada has the world’s longest seacoast, over 40,000 miles long, and a 
history of trans-Atlantic trade. It relied on the Royal Navy (RN) to protect 
its maritime commerce in the nineteenth century and increasingly on the 
United States for continental defence when the prospect of war with that na-
tion faded after the War of 1812. When Canada at last got its own navy in 1910 
it began the long struggle to develop and maintain a balanced fleet.
George Baer of the US Naval War College maintains that a navy is de-
veloped upon “the interaction of purpose, experience, and doctrine.”8 But 
in Canada’s case, naval purpose and doctrine have to be balanced against 
limited finances and manpower, as well as a government and populace 
traditionally reluctant to support a large military establishment. There are 
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two competing forces that have traditionally been at odds in Canada. On 
the one hand, Canadians on the whole have never appreciated the costs of 
maintaining a truly independent navy that did not need to rely on its al-
lies for sovereignty protection. While the public expects its navy to protect 
Canadian sovereignty on all three oceans and to rely on its allies only when 
continental security is threatened, it is unwilling to divert scarce resources to 
build and operate a navy with such capabilities. On the other hand, Canada 
has a proud maritime tradition and naval personnel willing and able to pro-
tect its sovereignty and to contribute to multinational alliances if the funds 
are forthcoming.
“For the professional Navy [World War II] had produced the ultimate 
victory … [a navy] with smaller versions of the fleet units employed by the 
large navies.” The RCN had grown from a fleet of six destroyers, four mine-
sweepers, 1500 RCN regulars and 1500 RCN Reserves (RCNR) in 1939, to 400 
ships (excluding auxiliary ships) and nearly 100,000 naval personnel. While 
the very real problems encountered by a force growing so quickly have been 
documented, by 1943 the RCN hit its stride and a Canadian, Rear Admiral 
Leonard Murray, was in command of the northwest Atlantic theatre.9 The 
RCN objective was to maintain as much of its fleet as possible after the war 
and avoid the disastrous lesson of unpreparedness that occurred in the inter-
war years.
Both the USN and the RCN began postwar planning by 1943, and in 1945 
both faced postwar governments committed to heeding the public’s cry for 
rapid demobilization. Navies in a democracy need public support. In Canada 
this meant that the RCN had to be convincing in its actions in order to “sell” 
its postwar agenda of a modern, balanced fleet comprising destroyers, cruis-
ers, and a naval aviation branch with aircraft carriers. New ships built and 
contributing to the war effort “would offer the RCN an opportunity to win 
battle honours … and so greatly enhance the chances of their acceptance by 
public opinion as part of the postwar Canadian Navy.”10
During the war the navy “achieve[d] its own independence and signifi-
cance,” with particular expertise in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and the 
defence of shipping. Emerging as the third largest Allied navy by the end of 
the war, the RCN’s professional sailors did not want to lose their unpreced-
ented blue-water capabilities. The RCN ended the war with 93,000 personnel 
and 939 ships, two cruisers, fourteen destroyers and a former Axis subma-
rine.11 Two British escort carriers had Canadian commanders and crews.
What was envisioned for the peacetime RCN can be seen from the 
1943 appreciation by Lt. Commander G.F. Todd, RCNVR. The RCN’s policy 
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planner from 1940-1943 and Secretary to the Canadian Joint Staff Mission 
in London from 1944-1945, Todd proposed RCN cooperation with the Royal 
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) in protecting Canada, Newfoundland, and 
Labrador’s coastal waters “against all attacks except sustained battleship at-
tacks launched by major naval powers.” In addition, the RCN would “con-
tribute to the maintenance of Imperial sea communications at least to the ex-
tent of providing trade protection forces proportionate to the size of Canada’s 
merchant marine; [and] contribute to the joint defence of the oceans adjacent 
to North America.”12 This could be done by “a post-war navy of three cruis-
ers, two light fleet carriers, 16 fleet destroyers, 19 frigates and eight Algerine 
minesweepers.”13
In his 1944 report, “Post-war Strategic Security of Canada,” Todd main-
tained that any attacks on Canada would be “[s]poradic attacks … essentially 
diversionary operations.” Threats to Canadian security would come by air 
or sea, or from forces using islands in close proximity to Canada, such as 
St. Pierre and Miquelon, Greenland or Iceland, among others. While he 
supported joint North American defence, Todd believed that Canada was 
responsible for continental defence “on an appropriate scale.” With regard 
to the Arctic, Todd referred to a two-ocean, not a three-ocean navy. He 
mentioned the Aleutians as a possible base for invasion, but expected them 
to be defended by the United States. To defend Canada and contribute to 
continental defence, Todd believed that Canada needed “adequate naval and 
air forces, including anti-submarine, anti-surface vessels and anti-aircraft 
escort ships, with heavy covering ships and striking forces, and ship-borne 
and shore-based aircraft, and necessary operational and repair naval and air 
bases.”14
Reality for the postwar RCN came in the form of a government and na-
tion resolved to downsize. Of Canada’s three services, it was the RCN that 
had the greatest difficulty establishing a postwar role, in part because the 
government had not determined the country’s naval commitments. Not un-
like the dilemma facing the USN, the RCN had to redefine itself and its role in 
the postwar world. In both nations, navies faced military and political lead-
ers who saw the navy of the future as no more than an escort and transport 
branch, stripping it of its aviation arm and reducing the size and composition 
of the fleet to no more than “a support service.” In fact, Jan Drent, RCN (ret.) 
suggests that “[i]t is arguable that these vociferous power struggles [between 
the USAF and USN] could have raised questions in the minds of Canadian 
politicians and reinforced doubts.” There were also threats in both nations of 
service unification and cost-cutting measures.15
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In an effort to provide justification for “a `big ship’ navy, not an escort 
force,” the RCN and USN had to prove their worth and outline their postwar 
roles and missions. This was made all the more difficult by both govern-
ments, which had yet to formalize their postwar foreign policy. Canada was 
unsure of the place it would occupy in the world. Without clear direction 
from the government, military planning is at best difficult, and it is certainly 
risky, as capital expenditures are not only extremely expensive but also ne-
cessitate long-term planning. “Flexibility was the keynote of naval policy,” 
but it was a challenge for the RCN to define the type and extent of the navy 
and its desire for an Arctic presence, in light of its other commitments, the 
Liberal government’s traditional “anti-militarism,” and the current govern-
ment’s determination, led by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, to fund little 
more than, in the words of Minister of National Defence, Douglas Abbott, “a 
good workable little fleet.”16
Convinced of its unique and essential value to Canadian defence, stub-
bornly committed to preserving a robust fleet manned by professional sail-
ors, and determined to carve out an indispensable postwar role, the RCN 
looked North. Arguably, the Arctic provided the navy with an important 
theatre and function in the postwar era, one that was instrumental to not 
only Canadian but also continental defence. In addition, it would buttress the 
naval case against Ottawa’s proposed drastic budget cuts that could severely 
curtail, if not eliminate, an RCN Arctic presence, thus undermining both 
defence and the politically-sensitive issue of sovereignty assertion. But the 
RCN was unable to sustain its case. Retrenchment in the services was severe 
and by 1947 only a skeleton fleet was left. Manpower had fallen and the RCN 
“officer corps [was] down to a core of RN-trained professionals.” Mackenzie 
King initially opposed an aircraft carrier, considering it “overly grandiose” 
for Canada. He also believed that the USN and the RN could be counted on 
to defend Canada’s maritime interests. Although he finally came around to 
supporting the acquisition of a single carrier for Canada, as long as it could 
operate in northern waters, his anti-military attitude permitted little in the 
way of a robust, balanced fleet.
In assessing the postwar world the Post-Hostilities Problems Working 
Committee’s (PHP) 1944 report, “Post-war Canadian Defence Relationship 
with the United States,” concluded that the North American continent 
was “vulnerable” to attack by air from the north. It maintained that the 
Soviet-American relationship was of “special concern to Canada” and that 
while Canada “must accept full responsibility for defence measures within 
Canadian territory,” as well as for Newfoundland and Labrador, “it [was] 
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clear that defence planning for Canada and the United States should be co-
ordinated.” To this end, Canada needed to “maintain larger armed forces 
than before the war.”17
The Canadian military did not dispute the PHP’s findings or its recom-
mendations. In late 1947, the American and Canadian governments endorsed 
the Permanent Joint Board on Defense’s (PJBD) 35th Recommendation (1946) 
for military cooperation and collaboration. But there were also those within 
the Canadian government who sought to assert a greater Canadian presence 
in the North in order to solidify sovereignty claims. They feared that joint 
defence arrangements with the United States could hinder that end. The 
military was aware of its limitations and, efforts to increase its presence and 
knowledge of the North notwithstanding, was convinced that bilateral mil-
itary cooperation was necessary for the defence of North America. During 
the war, Major-General Maurice Pope noted that “[t]o the American[s] the 
defence of the United States is continental defence, which includes [Canada] 
…. [and, in the event of war, it] would look to [Canada] to make common 
cause … [without] delay.”18 In the postwar period, the military supported 
Pope’s recommendation for continued bilateral cooperation and argued that 
“exclusive claims to sovereignty must be fitted into the overall requirements 
of continental security and defence.”19
In “this trying period, between a war that is over and a peace that is not 
yet secure,” the world struggled for stability as the new balance of power took 
shape.20 The Canadian government’s view of the USSR as a menace to world 
stability was reached independently of the United States, but its conclusion 
was similar to that of its southern neighbour. The Canadians subscribed to 
George Kennan’s view that while “the Russians were not planning a direct 
attack … a Russian misunderstanding or miscalculation” might lead to war 
and to his advocacy of containment. Yet even though the Soviets were en-
gaged in developing their Arctic regions, the government wanted to ensure 
that Canadian northern development “would not be provocative” and that 
there would be “as much civilian `cover’ for defense projects as possible.” 
Canada determined that collaboration with the United States was in its best 
interest; it did not enter cooperative agreements because of pressure from 
the south. Overall, “there was no substantial difference between the view-
point of the Canadian and United States representatives as to the objective of 
the Soviet Union and as to the effect on Soviet foreign policy of joint North 
American defense measures.”21 As postwar planning continued, in fact, the 
Americans noted that “[w]here the Canadians diverge from us, or oppose us, 
is chiefly in matters of execution, method and timing.”22
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The RCN and Postwar Realities
The new arena for the postwar RCN was the Arctic. Previously, Canadian 
military commitments in the Arctic had been solely to protect Canadian 
sovereignty. A prewar presence had been maintained by the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police and the Eastern Arctic Patrol. After the war, the RCN had no 
“definite tactical doctrine for Northern operations,” but like the US military, 
the other Canadian services, and even the Canadian public and govern-
ment, it “was swept up in the `polar passion.’” This passion, however, had 
a catalyst and a price tag. According to Rear Admiral A.H.G. Storrs, RCN 
(ret), American military interest in the North spurred Canada into action, 
directly contributing to the decision for the RCN cruise into Hudson Strait 
and Hudson Bay.23
The USN had a history of Arctic involvement which continued after the 
war. In March 1946, Operation “Frostbite” sent the aircraft carrier Midway, 
three destroyers and a tanker into Davis Strait. The carrier held take-off and 
landing exercises with planes and helicopters in snow and freezing tem-
peratures. Operations in the Labrador Sea were intended to test “the feas-
ibility of carrier operations in the Arctic.” Later that same year, Operation 
“Nanook,” a joint USN/Marine exercise in Canada’s territorial waters of 
Viscount Melville and Lancaster Sounds, included a landing near Dundas 
Harbor on North Devon Island. The Americans were careful to obtain per-
mission, and although Canada declined the offer to participate, a Canadian 
observer was aboard.24
In 1947 the USN was back in the Arctic when it supplied materials for 
the first of five Joint Arctic Weather Stations (JAWS) in Canadian territory. 
The Canadians were again invited to participate but declined. Although the 
RCN at this point still had one carrier, two cruisers, eighteen frigates and 
destroyers, and nine minesweepers, it had no submarines or icebreakers, 
and was suffering severe manpower difficulties.25 The Americans, for their 
part, not only sent surface ships into the Arctic waters but also experimented 
with submarines. USS Atule had attempted to submerge in Baffin Bay in 1946, 
but was forced to abandon the mission when its periscope was damaged. In 
1947 the Navy Electronics Laboratory in San Diego, which employed some 
Canadian scientists, experimented with submarines maneuvering through 
ice packs while on the surface and, later that year, transited under the ice of 
the Chukchi Sea. But, even with successful trials and enthusiasm on the part 
of its participants and sponsors, the USN did not see the immediate promise 
of submarines. “[T]here was no thought at the time of military operations 
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in Arctic areas.”26 Tight budgets also precluded anything more than supply 
missions to the weather stations in 1947.27
American interest in the North was not only maritime. While it is be-
yond the scope of this paper to chronicle the other American projects in 
the Canadian North, “U.S. requests to fly over, march over, or sail through 
Canadian territory seemed to be coming thick and fast, especially through 
military channels.” An overriding Canadian concern, regardless of the service 
making the request, was to protect Canadian sovereignty and independence. 
For their part, the Americans made it clear in the 36th Recommendation of 
the PJBD, and in President Truman’s 11 February 1947 speech to the Canadian 
parliament, that they were committed to respecting that sovereignty. “It was 
totally unrealistic for Ottawa to consider denying the United States access to 
the Arctic when the U.S. thought of Canada’s arctic frontier as a continental 
front line and when the two countries had been so closely tied together in 
continental defence matters since 1940.” Canada believed that collaboration 
was in the national interest, and permission granted to the United States was 
not motivated by American pressure. But lessons had been learned during 
the war. The military wanted to be certain that, unlike in World War II, it was 
made “more fully aware” of the American assessment of North American 
“defence requirements” in order to better evaluate American demands on 
Canadian land and facilities. This would be facilitated by a postwar role for 
the PJBD.28
Planning an Arctic Cruise
For its part, the Canadian military also wanted a larger role in the North. 
RCN interests included “Arctic oceanography, the re-supply of northern sta-
tions, and anti-submarine activity in Northern waters.” Sovereignty asser-
tion was not a priority, but the navy wanted to be able to operate in its own 
backyard and to be recognized as the owner of the real estate. In 1946, the 
year of the Midway transit, the Canadian Army approached the RCN with a 
plan for joint exercises in the Arctic. The army’s plan was not enthusiastically 
received by the RCN. Commander Storrs believed that “[t]he exercise pro-
posed [by the Army] is extremely ambitious and the light-hearted approach 
to the Naval angle seems to indicate a somewhat superficial consideration of 
the problems involved.” He did not see the need to freeze in a ship during the 
winter and felt that more preliminary work needed to be carried out before 
committing the RCN to such an exercise.29
Captain H.N. Lay, Director of Naval Plans and Intelligence from 
December 1945 to April 1948, wrote in October 1946 “that the idea of a 
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purely Canadian Arctic Expedition is an excellent one. As the Army paper 
mentions, we know that U.S.S.R. are [sic] taking a considerable amount of 
interest in the Arctic regions, and we have some reason to suspect that a 
Russian submarine has been operating in the Davis Strait.” He observed 
that the United States was actively interested in the Arctic and that the 
Americans believed there was an “urgent [need for] … the collection of in-
formation of a topographical, hydrographical and climatic nature, together 
with information as to how equipment and personnel stand up to Arctic 
conditions.”30
Lay also noted that he had already held two meetings to ascertain the 
state of Arctic research and what the army had thus far completed. He also 
interviewed individuals with Arctic experience and discussed the require-
ments for ships that could be used in such an expedition. The vessels needed 
to be strengthened to operate in ice-infested waters and to withstand being 
“frozen in” during the winter. Since Canada did not have the necessary ships 
for the joint exercise, one option considered was to call on the USN. This was 
rejected, however, because, according to Lay, “this would almost certainly 
mean that the USN would wish to be the dominant partner in the expedition, 
and … if Canada is able to do it herself, she should do so.” Thus, the RCN 
needed to ice-strengthen one of its own ships.31
At the Naval Staff meeting one week later, members noted the wide 
range of objectives and experiments that could be completed during such an 
exercise, but the expense in funds and time to refit a ship, they concluded, 
was not worth the expense. Other venues already existed or were planned 
that could provide much of the same information. The Naval Staff preferred 
an Arctic cruise – sending ships north “during the season of open naviga-
tion to study navigational and operational conditions.” The Naval Board 
concurred.32
In April 1947, the Naval Staff discussed such a northern voyage. The 
members noted that there was interest in the Canadian Arctic at this point in 
time, but they did not identify who was interested. The Staff supported the 
idea of a cruise into Hudson Bay and Hudson Strait, as it “would be of benefit 
to the Canadian defence programme,” but they did not say how. As there 
were to be no USN expeditions like Operation “Nanook” in 1947, joining the 
Americans was not an option. But the “Naval Staff was of the firm opinion 
that it would be preferable to undertake a northern cruise under Canadian 
auspices.” The chief difficulty was “the recent drastic curtailment in fuel sup-
plies available to the RCN.” The pros and cons of the cruise were discussed 
and the Naval Staff recommended that plans be prepared for 1947. The RCAF 
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and the Canadian Army would be contacted about sending liaison officers. 
The Naval Board approved both the cruise and the approach.33
In May 1947 Captain Lay noted that expeditions into the Canadian 
Arctic had been mounted by the RN, USN, RCMP, Hudson’s Bay Co., and 
other Canadian government departments, such as Mines and Resources. 
While the USN had operated in Baffin Bay and transited west to Melville 
Sound in 1945-1946, the RCN could only look at this with envy, as it had not 
been in these waters. As the North grew in importance, Lay felt that the RCN 
needed to become familiar with the challenges posed by these waters. He 
proposed a cruise into Hudson Bay and Hudson Strait, waters that the RCN 
had never transited. The agenda was to include “familiarization” with the 
waters, radio testing “within the auroral belt,” bathythermographic readings, 
hydrographic soundings, and magnetic observations. Later projects included 
work on L/F LORAN stations, oceanographic temperature and salinity read-
ings, and RCAF “tracking and other exercises.”34 The cruise needed to be 
conducted when the strait and bay were ice free, between mid-August and 
mid-September, since the hulls of the destroyers could not withstand the ice.
Three routes were proposed. Fuel requirements were a major considera-
tion and tables outlined distance, tons of fuel, and days of travel. Fuel was 
more expensive in Churchill than in Halifax ($5.25/barrel versus $3.12), so 
the planners needed to keep the amount needed in Churchill to a minimum. 
The cost of the Churchill fuel was to be deducted “by an equivalent amount” 
from the year’s quota. Lay suggested the tanker CNAV Dundalk be utilized 
between Halifax and Churchill for refuelling. Since navigational problems 
off the Labrador coast included “inadequate charts, large magnetic variation 
and frequency of fog and poor visibility,” a gyro compass or radar was ne-
cessary for Dundalk to operate in the western end of Hudson Strait and the 
northern part of Hudson Bay. Lay proposed that Dundalk travel with a ship 
that had a gyro compass, but eventually approval was given for Dundalk to 
be outfitted with its own at a cost close to $1000.35
Ironically, at the same time that planning was taking place for the 
Northern cruise, the Canadian government placed even more restrictions on 
the military. For the RCN, government-dictated cuts required further reduc-
tions in recruiting, ships, and fuel allowances.36 This was at a time when the 
RCN was already struggling with a “critical shortage of manpower.” There 
were “more trained men going out than coming in, and [there was] the diffi-
culty of tr[ainin]g the new entries with existing facilities.”37 These reductions 
and problems were contributing factors to the cancellation of the cruise of 
1947.38
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Map 5. From C.S. Beals, Science, History and Hudson Bay (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1968).
Even with government-mandated reductions, the RCN was committed 
to training its personnel in efficient ASW which, it was convinced, necessitat-
ed a submarine. Discussed in mid-1947, proposals for submarines included 
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loans from the USN and the RN, but no submarine was purchased at this 
time.39
Northern Cruise, 1948
As plans for the cruise were resurrected for 1948, the issue of fuel shortages 
remained. Care had to be taken to allocate fuel to last the entire year and thus 
avoid “drastic curtailment of activity during the latter part of the year.” The 
ships eventually employed for the cruise were the newly “arcticized” aircraft 
carrier HMCS Magnificent, under the command of Commodore G.R. Miles, 
with 19 Carrier Air Group aboard; tribal destroyer HMCS Haida, commanded 
by Lieutenant-Commander A.F. Pickard; and HMCS Nootka, under the com-
mand of Commander A.H.G. Storrs.40 The voyage took place 2-28 September 
1948. These were the first Canadian warships to enter Canada’s Arctic waters.
Magnificent, Haida, and Nootka sailed from Halifax and proceeded north 
to Wakeham Bay, Labrador. Sufficient leeway was left on the route from 
Halifax to Wakeham Bay to enable senior officers to react to conditions en-
countered. Magnificent only travelled as far north as Wakeham Bay, where it 
topped off the destroyers with fuel. Magnificent did not venture into Hudson 
Bay, although Lay had recommended it. Lay believed such a voyage would 
save fuel costs, which were incurred both by shipping oil to Churchill and by 
using Dundalk. It also would have provided more RCAF training time.41 But 
only the destroyers entered Hudson Bay and proceeded to Churchill.
A ship of impressive size, Magnificent did much to publicize the voyage. 
But its inclusion also had a military purpose. It was to give the Air Force an 
opportunity:
to familiarize RCAF crews with Naval operations, to carry out 
shadowing exercises with the Carrier Force and to carry out pa-
trols … From a Naval stand point it was to enable their fighter 
aircraft to deal with enemy attacks from the air, make fighter 
interceptions and to familiarize the Task Force personnel with 
RCAF tactics.42
While the Director of the Naval Air Division advised against the carrier par-
ticipating in the cruise, the Chief of Naval Staff held firm.43
 Two RCAF search-and-rescue planes from 103 SAR (Search and Rescue) 
Flight, Greenwood, Nova Scotia, took part in joint tactical exercises: a Canso 
and a Lancaster (the Canso being the slower of the two). Fog was relatively 
constant, but simulated war conditions were employed, with Task Force 
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interceptions, shadowing, homing, and patrols carried out in the Strait of 
Belle Isle. Unfortunately, naval aircraft shadowing and interception exercises 
with Magnificent were only possible on 4 September, due to “weather and 
other causes.” The Lancaster was able to practice radar and homing exercises 
and patrols with the destroyers on other days. Officials put a positive spin 
on the practice flights. “[T]he cooperation exercises with the Task Force were 
quite successful, … ET communication was excellent, and … a good time 
was had by all.” The word from Magnificent was that “Joint exercises now 
completed. Thank you for your ready co-operation. The exercises have been 
of great value to Magnificent.”44
 On the voyage to and from Churchill, the two destroyers carried out radio, 
L/F LORAN and hydrographic observations, and temperature and salinity 
tests. The four day visit to Churchill, 11-15 September, was called Operation 
“Seadog.” Nootka and Haida were open to the public for tours; an evening 
with the Governor General was planned; sailors toured Churchill; and par-
ties were arranged for the officers.45 Departing Churchill, the ships docked at 
Port Burwell, after a two-day stop at Coral Harbour on Southampton Island. 
Refuelling at Port Burwell from Dundalk, which had been sent from Halifax 
for just this purpose, was successful and the ships then sailed for home.
 Prior to the voyage there had been RCN interest in not only working 
with the RCAF but also the Department of Mines and Resources. In 1947 the 
Naval Staff, recognizing that survey work was needed, suggested that the 
RCN could help Mines and Resources by conducting surveys when its ships 
were in northern waters. The Naval Board, however, rejected the idea, believ-
ing such surveys were the responsibility of the civilian department. But offi-
cials at Mines and Resources were persistent. In 1948, Deputy Minister Hugh 
Keenleyside contacted the Department of Defence when the RCN’s northern 
cruise was scheduled. He stated that sea and air navigation would benefit 
from better magnetic information in that area of the world and offered the 
services of Dominion Astronomer Dr. C.S. Beals to carry out the appropriate 
observations. Deputy Minister Mills replied that the Department of Defence 
had already contacted a Dominion Observatory astronomer.46
 It has been claimed that “[i]t is a sound nile that the amount of work an 
expedition accomplishes is in inverse proportion to the amount of publicity 
it gets.”47 And it can be claimed with some justification that although there 
was value in the scientific observations, readings and limited air exercises, 
“the accomplishment [of the Northern Cruise] was minimal” and “[c]om-
pared to the rigours of winter patrols in the Northern Atlantic, these voyages 
were pleasure cruises.”48 But, it can also be argued that the real value of the 
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cruise was the national pride of seeing the Canadian flag in the Arctic, and 
RCN pride in its ability to transit these northern waters for the first time. 
The expedition involved 300 sailors during its twenty-seven-day trip, and 
the destroyers went to 62 degrees N, the farthest north any RCN ship had yet 
reached. These were the first RCN ships in Hudson Bay, and although they 
encountered fog, snow and icebergs, the cruise was successfully navigated.
 There was no lack of publicity. The RCN made sure there were photo-
graphs of the cruise, and newspapers carried both RCN photos and state-
ments from the commanders.49 In addition, the RCN had observers from the 
United States, UK, and other Canadian services on board. Observers aboard 
Haida were the UK’s Senior Naval Advisor to the British High Commissioner 
in Canada, Capt. Sir Robert Stirling-Hamilton; US Naval Attaché to Canada, 
Capt. Benjamin Scott Custer; a representative of the Defence Research Board, 
Lieutenant William Bailey, RCN (R); geophysicist A.A. Onhausser from the 
Dominion Observatory; three representatives of the Canadian Army; and 
three servicemen from the RCAF.
Post-Cruise Realities
While there is no doubt that the RCN was proud of the Northern cruise, it 
was concurrently evaluating its role in other theatres; its relationship with 
allies and potential enemies; and the reality of even more budget cuts. In 
1947 Commander Storrs predicted that future wars would necessitate a navy 
that utilized submarines and aircraft. Mines would also be a factor, while 
surface ships would not be the source of major attacks. Storrs concluded that 
the RCN’s role would be similar to that of World War II plus “direct defence 
of coastal and overseas sea communications.”50 This necessitated ships of 
“greater speed, better sea keeping qualities, and … of such construction as 
to promote rapid production in an emergency. The ultimate development 
may well be a form of modified Hunt class Destroyer.” Since Canada’s naval 
budget was limited, Storrs believed that the RCN must concentrate on “anti-
air, anti-submarine and anti-mining forces.” He advised a fleet with “the 
nuclear operational forces suitable for the kind of war in which Canada will 
be engaged.”51
While “Canada had the rudiments of a maritime strategy that considered 
the Arctic’s geostrategic location,” such a broad range of commitments 
placed a strain on the RCN’s limited resources. Thus, while the cruise did 
take place in late 1948, an Arctic presence was not sustainable. Consideration 
for acquiring an icebreaker and continuing northern cruises “during ice-free 
periods” was made by the Naval Board, but in 1948 the RCN remained at a 
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crossroads.52 To grow, it needed a mandate and for the mandate to be funded 
it needed to fit the government’s foreign policy objectives. There were in-
creases in both manpower and equipment that year, and the government’s 
1949 White Paper noted the RCN’s responsibility for protecting Canadian 
coastal waters, but it also committed the Navy to protect allied Atlantic 
shipping lanes. Consequently, while the navy’s responsibilities included the 
Arctic coast, and the naval icebreaker Labrador was approved, subsequent 
NATO commitments and tight budgets eventually closed the curtain on an 
Arctic presence.53
HMCS Labrador reflected a traditional problem facing Canada: American 
interest in Canadian territory was perceived as a threat to sovereignty and it 
elicited a response.54 But the wisdom and ability of such action is question-
able. Jan Drent, RCN, contends that Labrador “was the result of a political de-
termination to underline Canadian sovereignty … [a] decision to use a war-
ship for an essentially peacetime role.”55 Its 1958 transfer to the Department 
of Transport was highly controversial both within the RCN and the govern-
ment. There was debate as to whether a naval ship in the Arctic was a better 
symbol of Canadian sovereignty than a Department of Transport vessel.56 
Although important as a research and escort ship, Labrador was unable to 
find a niche in the RCN of the 1950s. After only seven years in naval service, 
four of them in the High Arctic, Labrador was turned over to the Department 
of Transport.57
Lt. William Hessler, USN, maintains that military policy needs to ac-
knowledge and address the “interplay of geography and technology.” The 
former is a constant and “dictates the main contours of any nation’s strategy,” 
while the latter “is the prime arbiter of weapons and their tactical use.” But 
surely another crucial factor in formulating military policy is budgetary real-
ity. This is most certainly true for Canada. Ultimately, NATO commitments, 
which were affordable, utilized the new Canadian-built St. Laurent class 
ships and highlighted RCN expertise in ASW and sea lane defence. These 
became the driving forces in RCN equipment acquisitions, and personnel 
and training plans. “Adherence to [NATO] … marked the end of what little 
independence Canada had retained in post-war naval planning.” With lim-
ited men and finances, this was really the RCN’s only option. World War II 
had “defined the role for the modern Canadian navy within an alliance;” to 
choose NATO responsibilities (an alliance role) over Arctic patrols (an unilat-
eral role) made sense. A decision to commit forces against a known enemy, 
as opposed to asserting sovereignty against perceived threats to sovereignty 
by an ally, was understandable. Faced with government skepticism over 
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the need for a blue-water navy, the RCN realized “that the survival of the 
fleet was a function of continental defence” and NATO responsibilities. Joel 
Sokolsky has gone so far as to claim that “[t]he commitment to NATO saved 
the RCN from oblivion in the nuclear age by providing it with a sound stra-
tegic role.”58
This postwar naval role concurrently supported the government’s 
foreign policy, proving and providing Canadian commitment to an active 
involvement in western security and justifying a Canadian voice in such 
matters. Without a clear naval threat to continental security in Arctic wat-
ers, Canadians were unwilling to fund a navy capable of maintaining a 
Northern presence. The end of the Cold War has only reinforced this attitude. 
Canadians have the same strong emotional attachment to the North that 
existed in 1948 and they still condemn an American presence in the disputed 
Northwest Passage. But Canadians also continue to support bilateral defence 
arrangements which provide continental security and relieve them of the 
expense of fielding a force to protect the North. Thus, in terms of accommo-
dating the conflicting realities of being responsible for three oceans but liv-
ing with a government and public reluctant to provide the funds necessary 
to carry out this mandate, the present Canadian Navy is not so very different 
from what it was fifty years ago.
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